Dialectic of Manipulation in Autopoietic Interpreting[1]

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Abstract

The study of manipulation in translation has drawn significant attention in translation and interpreting studies. Yet, the ontological, epistemological, and teleological aspects of manipulation have almost remained untapped. The present study argues for the critical role of dialectic of manipulation in interpreting (DMII) – manipulative interpretation of manipulative source text. To this end, Trump's first UN address on Iran in 2017 and its simultaneous interpretation into Persian are examined, by way of exemplar, in the light of integrating Luhmann's (1986, 1995) autopoietic social system theory at the macro-level of discourse into Baker's (2006) socio-communicative narrative theory at the micro-level of discourse. Findings suggest that where dialectic of manipulation is at play in the interpretation of political discourse, interpreting along with its ST as an autopoietic subsystem of the communication social system could possibly play its enlightening and emancipatory role in a) laying bare the ideological moves and unequal power relations encoded and embedded in the representation of the world; b) in circulating or contesting narratives; and c) in giving rise to, interestingly enough, the autopoieticly subversive and retaliatory interpretation (ASRI) triggered by what Foucault terms regimes of truth.

Keywords: Autopoiesis, autopoieticly subversive and retaliatory interpretation (ASRI), dialectic of manipulation in interpreting (DMII), narrative theory, regimes of truth

1. Introduction

Manipulation, in its polemical, subversive sense rather than corrective, in translation and interpreting is purported to be challenging and even babelizing the communication flow between language pairs by way of serving the interest of the target community the translator and interpreter presuppose, thus contributing to the essentialist thought of diversity under unity. Yet, the interpretation replete with manipulation could possibly constitute communication flow provided that its source text (ST) relays a manipulative version of facts and realities, in turn contributing to the ideal of unity under diversity, hence dialectic of manipulation in interpreting (henceforth DMII). Reflection on such a re-manipulation resulting in DMII seems to have remained untouched in translation studies (TS), despite the given that the concept and act of manipulation per se (either advertent or inadvertent) through activist translation and interpreting and translator and interpreter's agency have continued to receive constant attention particularly in the context of political discourse at the time of conflict (see, e.g., Farahzad 2003; Baker 2006; Salama-Carr 2007; Moradi-Joz et al 2014; Pan 2015; Daghigh et al. 2018; Gao 2020; Wang 2020; Li and Pan 2021, among many others).

To exemplify as to how manipulative interpretation of manipulative source text could give way to DMII, an excerpt of English-Persian language pair is examined. To analyze the interpretation in the course of illustrating DMII, Luhmann's (1986, 1995) autopoietic (self-reproductive) social system theory at the higher-level of discourse is integrated into Baker's (2006) socio-communicative narrative theory at the lower-level of discourse.

2. Integrating Autopoietic Social System Theory into Socio-Communicative Narrative Theory

As corroborated by Luhmann (1995), the autopoiesis theory was developed by Maturana and Varela (1980), two Chilean evolutionary biologists, to address the

very nature of life. In this context, autopoiesis means recursive self-reproduction of a living system by itself. Luhmann (1986, 1995) relocates and reconceptualizes autopoiesis to make a case for the mechanisms by which social systems operate. Forsaking both agency and structure, Luhmann recognizes communication as the main element guaranteeing the autopoiesis of social systems. In effect, social systems avail of "communications as their particular mode of autopoietic reproduction. Their elements are communications which are recursively produced and reproduced by a network of communications and which cannot exist outside of such a network" (Luhmann 1986, p. 174). In an attempt to apply Luhmann's autopoiesis social system theory (SST) to translation studies, Tyulenev (2012) conceptualizes translation as mediation, a hetero-referential communicative event, and a "self-organizing system" (2012, p. 35).

To lend Luhmann (1986, 1995) and Tyulenev (2012) to our purpose, the ontological, epistemological, and teleological status of interpreting is taken into consideration altogether rather than its mere ontological status. Not only do we view interpreting as a representation of its ST, but we also consider the way in which the ST represents the facts and realities in question, the TT is received by the audience, and the given intention motivates the TT production. Viewed hence, interpreting along with its ST can serve as an autopoietic socio-communicative subsystem (element) incorporating into the reproduction of the communication social system. Facts and realities as the subject matter of communication serve as the environment of this autopoietic socio-communicative subsystem. The ST and its TT as an autopoietic social subsystem interact with their environment (facts and realities) in a way that the environment, as Luhmann (1995, 350) reckons, can only trigger internal processes in the system rather than determine them, hence misrepresentation (manipulation) of facts and realities through the given ST and manipulation of the ST through its TT – dialectic of manipulation in interpreting (DMII).

While Baker's (2006) socio-communicative narrative theory gives an account of our conception of the world shaped by the stories we tell and by which we are surrounded, and at the same time lays an emphasis firmly on the role of translation in disseminating or contesting narratives, it seems to rather fall short in explaining as to where the location of the translation and translator involved could be, and more importantly, what the consequence of viewing a manipulative translation built upon a ST manipulatively representing the world could be. Indeed, socio-communicative narrative theory has less to say about the ontological, epistemological, and teleological status of the text and translation in question, and the discursive representation of facts and realities in cross-linguistic communication. To address this gap, Luhmann's (1986, 1995) autopoietic SST at the higher level of discourse is integrated into Baker's (2006) socio-communicative narrative theory at the lower level of discourse in the course of conceptualizing DMII.

3. Dialectic of Manipulation in Interpreting

To exemplify DMII, a political speech and its interpretation is analyzed drawing on an integrated model encapsulating Luhmann's (1986, 1995) autopoietic SST and Baker's (2006) socio-narrative theory. The sample is the interpretation transcript of Trump's speech in the UN General Assembly in 2017 on Iran, broadcast live on the Iranian state Khabar (News) channel, and simultaneously interpreted into Persian by Nima Chitsaz, an official correspondent and interpreter of IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting). The extract and its interpretation highlight the agency of interpreter in official setting, and more importantly, illustrate dialectic of manipulation in interpreting rooted in ideological moves and power differentials of the ST presupposed to be manipulatively representing facts and realities. This speech and its interpretation truly represent the conflict between Iran and the US over Iran's nuclear issue and its missile plan. Table 1 juxtaposes Trump's UN speech, its interpreting transcript, and its literal back translation into English.

Table 1. Trump's UN speech transcript (source text: ST) vs. the interpreting transcript (target text: TT) and its literal back translation (LT)

01	[ST: We face this decision not only in North Korea; it is far past time
02	for the nations of the world to confront another reckless regime, one
03	that speaks openly of mass murder, vowing death to America,
	destruction to Israel, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this
04	room.]
05	[TT: ما مشکلات دیگه ای رو هم با کشورهای دیگه داریم. ایران صحبتهایی میکنه برای از
06	بین بردن اسرائیل.]
	[LT: We have also some other problems with other countries. Iran has
07	some talks about annihilating Israel.]
08	[ST: The Iranian government masks a corrupt dictatorship behind the
09	false guise of a democracy. It has turned a wealthy country, with a
10	rich history and culture, into an economically depleted rogue state
	whose chief exports are violence, bloodshed, and chaos. The longest-
11	suffering victims of Iran's leaders are, in fact, its own people. Rather
12	than use its resources to improve Iranian live, its oil profits go to fund
13	Hezbollah and other terrorists that kill innocent Muslims and attack
14	their peaceful Arab and Israeli neighbors. This wealth, which rightly
	belongs to Iran's people, also goes to shore up Bashar al-Assad's
15	dictatorship, fuel Yemen's civil war, and undermine peace throughout
16	the entire Middle East.]
17	[TT: و به تعبیر ما میتونه زندگی ایرانیها بهتر باشه. از حزب الله دفاع میکنه و همنوع های
18	خودش رو میکشه. این رای کاملا به ملت ها بستگی داره. به اعتقاد ما ایران توی یمن دست
	دارد. به اعتقاد ما ایران توی یمن دست دارد و جنگ رو نوعی هدایت میکنه]
19	[LT: And in our view, Iranians' life can be better. It defends Hezbollah
20	and

21	kills its own fellowmen. This choice entirely depends on peoples. In our
22	belief, Iran interferes in Yemen. In our belief, Iran interferes in Yemen
23	and in one way or another directs the war.]
	[ST: We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing
24	activities while building dangerous missiles, and we cannot abide by
25	an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a
26	nuclear program. The Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-
	sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. Frankly, that
27	deal is an embarrassment to the United States, and I don't think you've
28	heard the last of it. Believe me.]

[TT: ما نمیتونیم اجازه بدهیم چنین کارهایی ادامه پیدا بکند. و بخواهد به ساخت موشک های
خودش ادامه بدهد. و ما همچین قراردادی را که بخواهد برای اینکه این سرپوشی را ایجاد
بکند، بهش پایبند نخواهیم بود برای اینکه بخواهد سلاح های هسته ای درست بکند. یکی از
بدترین قراردادهایی را که تا حالا دیده ام، قرارداد با ایران بود، برجام. من فکر میکنم این یک
خجالت بود، مایه شرم ایالات متحده بود. فکر میکنم هنوز آخرش رو نشنیدید، باور کنید
قرارداد بدی بوده]

[LT: We cannot let Iran continue with these actions and make its
missiles. We won't also abide by the deals disguising making nuclear
weapons. Iran deal, JCPOA, has been one of the worst deals I have
ever seen. I think this deal was an embarrassment to the US. I think
you have not heard the last of it. Believe me it was a very bad deal.]

[ST: It is time for the entire world to join us in demanding that Iran's
government end its pursuit of death and destruction. It is time for the
regime to free all Americans and citizens of other nations that they
have unjustly detained.]

[TT: من فکر میکنم الان زمان اون برای کل دنیا رسیده که بخواهد با ما همراه بشود و بخواهد
از راهی که ایران در پیش رو گرفته جلوگیری کنند. کنار آمریکا باشند.]

[LT: I think it is time for the entire world to join us in preventing Iran

43	from the pathway it has taken. It is time for the entire world to
44	accompany the US.]
45	[ST: And above all, Iran's government must stop supporting terrorists, begin serving its own people, and respect the sovereign rights of its
46	neighbors.]
47	[TT: از همه مهتر اینکه ایران به تعبیر ما باید از تروریستها، از حمایت از تروریستها دست
48	بردارد. و همینطور نسبت به همسایه هایش..!]
49	[LT: Above all, in our view, Iran must stop terrorists, supporting terrorists. And also with regard to its neighbors...!]
50	[ST: The entire world understands that the good people of Iran want
51	change, and, other than the vast military power of the United States,
52	that Iran's people are what their leaders fear the most.]
53	[TT: و چیزی در کنار ارتش آمریکاست که ارتش آمریکا ارتش بسیار قوی یی است. ملت ایران هم ملت قوی یی اند.]
54	[LT: And there is something with the US army and the US army is a
55	highly powerful army. Iran nation is also a powerful nation.]
56	[ST: This is what causes the regime to restrict internet access, tear
57	down satellite dishes, shoot unarmed student protesters, and imprison political reformers.]
58	[TT: بسیاری اتفاقات توی ایران میافتد که از نظر ما غیر قابل قبول است.]
59	[LT: There are many incidents taking place in Iran, which in our view
60	are not acceptable.]
61	[ST: Oppressive regimes cannot endure forever, and the day will come when the people will face a choice. Will they continue down the path
62	of poverty, bloodshed, and terror, or will the Iranian people return to
63	the nation's proud roots as a center of civilization, culture, and wealth,
64	where their people can be happy and prosperous once again?]
	[TT: رژیم هایی که بطور کل ملت خودشان را تحت ظلم و سلطه قرار می دهند باید مقابله

65	بشوند. ما فکر میکنیم تمام ملت ایران میتوانند برگردند به عنوان مرکز فرهنگ باشند، مرکز
66	[ثروت باشند، جایی که مردم شاد باشند]
67	[LT: The regimes generally oppressing and dominating their own people have to be confronted. We think all Iranian nation can return
68	to playing their role as the center of culture and the center of wealth,
69	where its people are happy.]
70	[ST: The Iranian regime's support for terror is in stark contrast to the recent commitments of many of its neighbors to fight terrorism and halt
71	its finance in Saudi Arabia early last year.]
72	[TT: من، این دقیقا برخلاف رفتاری است که ایران نشان میدهد من در جنگ با تروریسم
73	هستم]
74	[LT: I, Iran behavior is in strong contrast with what Iran pretends to be fighting against terrorism.]
75	

As a public narrative circulating via some world mass media, 'Iranoregimephobia' seems to be what Trump's speech in the UN general assembly tribune intends to spawn through accusing the Iranian government of undertaking 'destabilizing activities' (see, e.g., Moradi-Joz et al, 2019). This public narrative is embedded in one of the most recurrent meta-narratives, namely 'war on terror or the fear thereof.' As a representative of Republicans who has inherited his fellow-president Bush's narrative on Iran – 'Iran as the axis of evil' –, Trump often uses, as in this speech, again and again in connection with Iran, the expressions: 'Iran regime', 'destabilizing activities', 'rogue regime', reckless regime', 'corrupt dictatorship, 'pursuit of death and destruction', 'Iran's threatening nuclear and missile plans', 'terrorist regime', among others, to form by sheer force of repetition a counter-narrative (or counter-discourse) to the Iranian government narrative of supporting the Muslims of the world (see lines 1–4, 8–16, 23–28, 46–47, 52–54,

and 63–66). This truly illustrates the overlap between Baker's (2006, p. 3) account of narrative and Foucault's (1970s) conception of discourse as the construction of both narrative and discourse in the context of normalization through "publicly disseminated representations." However, Iranian government has always declared that its foreign policy and relations are based on Islamic teachings and doctrine.

Viewed hence, Iran's government claims to take the side of what it takes as oppressed Muslims. Yet, condemning the Iranian government of supporting Hezbollah, Yeman's Houthis, Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship (see lines 11–15), Trump seems to be blind to the doctrines setting in motion the Iranian government foreign policy, and takes it for granted that the Iranian government does not set its foreign policy and relations on the basis of what Americans call national interest (on the difference of the national interest conception between the American and Iranian governments, see, e.g., Moradi-Joz et al. 2019).

'Dissatisfaction of Iranians with their government' is another public narrative articulated in the speech (see lines 8–16, 52–54, 59–60, and 63–66). As Moradi-Joz et al. (2019) point out, although this public narrative circulates in Iran and accordingly some protests and uprisings in recent years (e.g., 2009 and 2018) could be indicative of a fact as such, the internal affairs of a state does not seem to be an issue of other countries interference, neither does it justify use of force against the given state, in that the domestic affairs, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the states should not be subjected to intervention of other states. This irrevocable principle known as non-intervention in the internal affairs of states signifies that a state should not otherwise intervene in a dictatorial way in the internal affairs of any other states (Article 2.4 of the UN Charter). Although mainly in the lines 60–62 Trump attempts to mitigate his condemning and even threatening tone concerning the Iranian government policies via addressing Iran's people with advising tone, the general air of his speech seems to remain contemptuous and

defiant of typical international relations. Moreover, the circulation of such narratives by such superpowers of the world as the US might instigate disturbances in countries like Iran.

An ontological narrative is at work in the lines 29–32, where Trump asserts that "the Iran deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into." The self-narrative of 'the worst deal', was publicly and repeatedly articulated by Trump since his presidential campaign. The repetition and circulation of this personal narrative can turn it into one of the public narratives of the US and its allies, in spite of the fact that the deal is in part the result of the US former democrat administration headed by Obama. Trump finally refused to re-endorse the Iran deal for the second time in 2018 when he felt that his personal narrative has gained enough currency to be marked as a public narrative. Trump's UN speech on Iran as represented through his propositions thus serves the purpose of delegitimizing Iran and disseminating 'Iranoregimephobia' in the world through a combination of ontological, public, and meta-narratives of the events going around.

An initial examination of the TT version reveals that the interpreter has outstandingly manipulated the ST to the extent that the interpretation could be marked as a different narration of the issues regarding Iran rather than the interpretation of Trump's address. The very first sentence of the TT (lines 5–8) and its comparison with that of the ST (lines 1–4) reveal that the interpreter has turned Trump's public narrative into the public narrative of the Iranian government, i.e. 'the US as an arrogant, imperialist, and diabolic regime striving for dominating and exploiting other nations including Iran', for that the US has 'also some problems with other countries' (the first line of the TT, 7–8) seeks to leave little doubt that the US is looking for adventure in the world.

The next paragraph of the ST which occupies 10 lines (9–18) is turned into four lines (22–25) in the TT. This quantitative comparison per se indicates that the ST is again manipulated by way of omission in the interpretation. Lines 9–13 bearing denominations like 'corrupt dictatorship', 'economically depleted rogue state', and 'exporter of violence, bloodshed, and chaos' are completely omitted in interpreting. Thinking modality is added to the beginning of the first proposition in this part of the TT to mitigate the illocutionary force (speaker's intention in delivering an utterance) of the message; 'in our view, Iranians' life can be better' (line 22). Such an addition can be seen in the next two propositions, 'in our belief' (23–25). All other denominations negatively representing other (Iran and its allies) are omitted in the TT: 'The longest-suffering victims of Iran's leaders', 'other terrorists', and 'Bashar al-Assad's dictatorship'.

In the next paragraph, the negative other representation realized through denomination, 'murderous regime', is yet again omitted in the interpreted version and is simply interpreted as 'Iran'. Two premodifiers appraising the Iranian government activities and missiles are also omitted in the first sentence: 'destabilizing activities' is interpreted into 'actions' and 'dangerous missiles' into 'missiles.' These also result in mitigating the tone of the speaker and weakening the public and ontological narratives proposed by the speaker (Lines 26–32 vs. 39–43).

Epistemic thinking modality is again added to the beginning of the next paragraph—'it is time for the entire world' (44) is interpreted into 'I think it is time for the entire world' (50) to manipulate, as Fairclough (2003, p. 168) maintains, "author's commitment to the truth" of proposition. In the same sentence, the American public narrative in the form of a noun phrase, 'its pursuit of death and destruction' (45), bearing negative other presentation, is implicitly rendered as 'the pathway it has taken' (51). The ending sentence of the paragraph is omitted in its

entirety – 'It is time for the regime to free all Americans and citizens of other nations that they have unjustly detained.'

Thinking modality, 'in our view', is again employed in the beginning of the next paragraph interpretation to mitigate the speaker's stance (53–55 vs. 58–59). The first sentence of the next paragraph, 'The entire world understands that the good people of Iran want change', is omitted in its entirety. Information change serve as the next sentence translation strategy to mitigate Trump's stance: 'other than the vast military power of the United States, Iran's people are what their leaders fear the most' (61–62) is rendered as 'And there is something with the US army and the US army is a highly powerful army. Iran nation is also a powerful nation' (65–66). In effect, another ontological narrative articulated by Trump is rendered as a public narrative in line with the interpreter's institutional base.

A shift in denomination negatively representing the Iranian government is at work in the next paragraph – 'the regime' is interpreted into 'Iran'. In this sentence explicitness change is employed to mitigate the illocutionary force of the proposition – 'restrict internet access', 'tear down satellite dishes', 'shoot unarmed student protesters', and 'imprison political reformers' – are simply reduced to 'many incidents taking place in Iran' (67–69 vs. 71–72). In the next paragraph, the evaluative term 'oppressive' premodifying and appraising the denominative term 'regime' is shifted, by way of rank shift, into an adjective clause 'oppressing and dominating their own people'. A shift in transitivity occurs in the same sentence – from 'cannot endure forever' to 'have to be confronted' – to turn a disciplinary (conceptual) narrative into an ontological one (73 vs. 82). According to Baker (2006), disciplinary (conceptual) narratives are "the stories and explanations that scholars in any field elaborate for themselves and others about their object of inquiry" (p. 39), and ontological narratives or narratives of the self are "personal stories that we tell ourselves about our place in the world and our own personal

history" (p. 28). In the next sentence, the first rhetorical question – 'Will they continue down the path of poverty, bloodshed, and terror' – is omitted in its entirety and thinking modality 'we think' is added to the next one to change author's commitment to the truth of proposition (75 vs. 82). Information change by way of a shift in evidentiality is the matter of the last sentence interpretation where 'halt its finance in Saudi Arabia early last year' is completely omitted in the interpreted version (86–87 vs. 90).

To the interpreter, fraught with "Iranoregimephobia", the ST thus seems to be re-narrated and re-presented as an anti-American (Americophobian) TT. In effect, the interpreter makes an attempt to challenge and even to contest the ontological, public, and meta narratives articulated by Trump, in turn constructing a counter-narrative to Trump's. And in so doing, he adopts two basic strategies: undertranslating and omitting most propositions and at best employing explicitness change (implicitation) – as is the case in almost all propositions – and adding such thinking modalities as 'in our view', 'in our belief', 'I think that', and 'we think that' to the other or same propositions in order to mitigate the illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect (the effect the utterance might have on a hearer) of the speech in favor of his own institutional interest and ideology altogether.

The interpreter seems to conceive the facts and realities of his text beyond the typical conception of the professional act of interpretation, in that he seems to view reality from the perspective of his institutional base, rather than from that of the ST, a text from which an interpreter is typically expected to interpret into. To the interpreter, the ST as a manipulative representation of the facts and realities regarding Iran is thus re-manipulated in the TT version, hence DMII.

As seen, interpreting together with its ST serves as an autopoietic socio-communicative subsystem (element) incorporating into the reproduction of the communication social system. Facts and realities as the subject matter of

communication serve as the environment of this autopoietic socio-communicative subsystem. The ST and its TT as an autopoietic social subsystem interact with their environment (facts and realities) in a way that the environment can only trigger the internal processes in the system rather than determine them, hence misrepresentation (manipulation) of facts and realities through the given ST and manipulation of the ST through its TT. This could bring about dialectic of manipulation in interpreting which in turn can give way to autopoieticly subversive and retaliatory interpretation (ASRI).

In line with Foucauldian (1979) conception of truth, one might suggest that the TT and its ST as an autopoietic social subsystem interact with the environment composed of the truth and knowledge governed by power structures – hence regimes of truth. In other words, the ST and its TT self-reproduce themselves through interacting with their environment composed of regimes of truth, which in turn is fueled by power differentials. Therefore, facts and realities turn to the regime of truth holding true for the given self-reproducing social subsystem of interpreting. Viewed hence, we must take Foucault's (1977) observation seriously that "truth isn't outside power, or deprived of power [...] truth is of the world: it is produced by virtue of multiple constraints. And it induces regulated effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth" (p. 13).

4. Conclusion

Interpretation can have a key part in (re)constituting and (re)constructing the discourses and narratives with transformative and subversive potential. In line with Baker (2006), Salama-Carr (2007), Lu (2009), Moradi-Joz et al (2014), Daghigh et al. (2018), Gao (2020), Wang (2020), Li and Pan (2021), and most critical work in TS, we found that, in pursuit of his own interests, concerns, and values, the interpreter (re-narrators), contesting the narrative promoted in the ST, has manipulatively reframed the STs and thus contributed to the construction of very

different narrative in order to meet his own ideological and axiological purposes emanated from different power differentials.

Instances of such obvious manipulations serving interpreter's intended target community aside, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that how, as illustrated, DMII teleologically speaking, has the potential to give way to ASRI. Such a DMII seems to have potential for de-authorizing and subverting the ST enunciator through the act of manipulation which has incorporated into the construction of the ST. To the bargain, where dialectic of manipulation is at play in the interpretation of political discourse, interpreting along with its ST as an autopoietic subsystem of the communication social system could possibly play its enlightening and emancipatory role in a) laying bare the ideological moves and unequal power relations encoded and embedded in the representation of the world; b) in, as Baker (2006) contends, circulating or contesting narratives; and c) in giving rise to, interestingly enough, the autopoieticly subversive and retaliatory interpretation (ASRI) triggered by what Foucault (1979) terms regimes of truth.

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و منصور توکلی[4]

چکیده:

مطالعۀ دستکاری در ترجمه از کانون‌های توجه چشم‌گیر در مطالعات ترجمه مکتوب و شفاهی بوده است. با وجود این، جنبه‌های هستی شناسانه، معرفت شناسانه، و غایت شناسانه دستکاری تقریباً ناشناخته مانده است. پژوهش حاضر استدلالی است درباب نقش کلیدی دیالکتیک دستکاری در ترجمه شفاهی (دی. ام. آی. آی.)—ترجمه شفاهی دستکاری شده از متن مبدأ دستکاری شده. بدین منظور، به رسم نمونه، اولین سخنرانی ترامپ در سازمان ملل درباره ایران و ترجمه شفاهی همزمان آن به زبان فارسی در سایۀ تلفیق نظریۀ خودنوگر سیستم اجتماعی لومان (۱۹۸۶، ۱۹۹۵) در سطح کلان گفتمان با نظریۀ روایت اجتماعی-ارتباطی بیکر (۲۰۰۶) در سطح خرد گفتمان مورد بررسی قرار گرفت. یافته‌ها نشان داد که در مواقعی که پای دیالکتیک دستکاری در ترجمه شفاهی گفتمان سیاسی در میان باشد، ترجمۀ شفاهی درکنار متن مبدأ خود به مثابۀ زیرسیستمی خودنوگر از سیستم اجتماعی ارتباطی احتمالا بتواند نقش روشنگرانه و رهایی‌بخش گر خود را در موارد زیر ایفا کند: الف) افشای انگیزش‌های ایدئولوژیک و مناسبات نامتوازن قدرت مکتوم و ریشه دوانده در بازنمود جهان ب) ترویج و اشاعه یا به چالش کشیدن روایت‌ها و ج) از همه جالب‌تر، ایجاد ترجمه شفاهی خودنوگر براندازگر و تلافی‌جویانه‌ای (ای. اس. آر. آی.) که برانگیزاننده آن همان چیزی است که فوکو از آن با عنوان رژیم‌های حقیقت یاد می‌کند.

واژه‌های راهنما: ترجمه شفاهی خودنوگر براندازگر و تلافی‌جویانه‌ای (ای. اس. آر. آی.)، خودنوگری، دیالکتیک دستکاری در ترجمۀ شفاهی (دی. ام. آی. آی.)، رژیم‌های حقیقت، نظریه روایت

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